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CANADA has entered a deep crisis in Arctic sci-ence. The lack of a formal Arctic Science andTechnology Policy has left our highly fragmented
efforts in Arctic research exceedingly vulnerable during
times of financial stress and left us effectively without a
voice. Logistical support, essential for operating in our
vast northern territory, has all but disappeared as a facilitator
for both government and university research. Within two
years, only specially funded research will be possible, and
opportunities for new careers will continue to plummet.
The Arctic science community must alert the government to
take action. If nothing is done to secure its future, Canada’s
capacity to perform Arctic research will collapse.
OUR PERSPECTIVE
The perspective we take here arises from acknowledg-
ing the following: (1) the results of the Federal Program
Review, which brought Arctic research to its present
crisis, are a fait accompli; government will not revisit
these decisions; (2) therefore, to find a solution, we require
a proposal that is politically supportable; (3) statements
very supportive of Arctic research can be read in recent
parliamentary documents; and (4) the downsizing of fed-
eral science occurred despite the mustering of the best
arguments available by many dedicated science managers
in support of the value of science; apparently these argu-
ments are not, in themselves, sufficient to achieve high
priority for science, especially for Arctic science, within
the federal public service. Hence, rebuilding the argu-
ments in support of Arctic science here is unlikely to take
us forward.
We feel that we are facing a social issue, a shortfall of
effective public support for Canadian science, which in-
cludes the research community. We also identify a struc-
tural issue for Arctic science, centred on the lack of an Act
of Parliament that defines the value of Arctic research to
the nation and secures its necessary infrastructure. What
follows is neither a scientific paper nor a scholarly review
of science policy or Arctic science history. Others are
better placed to produce these, or have already done so (see
Adams et al., 1987). We speak here as active Arctic
scientists who are alarmed by the rapid and continuing
erosion of northern research in Canada, and who wish to
highlight this crisis, draw instructive contrasts with recent
U.S. initiatives, and offer, for discussion, a possible solu-
tion in light of current Canadian circumstances. Our essay
seeks to make it clear that, if corrective action is not taken,
Canadian Arctic science will shrivel to insignificance.
WHERE WE ARE
Canada chairs the recently established Arctic Council
(1996) composed of the eight major northern nations. One
ought to expect such Canadian leadership by virtue of our
immense Arctic and Subarctic territories—well over half
the country. These are the homelands of our Arctic and
Subarctic First Nations peoples. As they are largely fed-
eral lands, the Canadian government bears the primary
responsibility in these areas for sustainable economic
development, cultural well-being, and environmental stew-
ardship. No other jurisdiction has the tax base to meet such
responsibilities.
Within the Arctic Council, the Canadian government
faces additional responsibilities as a partner to the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), operating
through four working groups (Arctic Monitoring and As-
sessment Program; Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna;
Protection of the Arctic Marine Ecosystem; and Emer-
gency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response). Canada
is also a member of the nongovernmental International
Arctic Science Committee (IASC), which adds research
commitments. Canada also participated in the Montreal,
Rio de Janeiro, and Kyoto accords, spurred by growing
concern for global change which, by all forecasts, will be
maximal in polar regions and could result in the disloca-
tion and alteration of entire ecosystems. Pollution of polar
regions, including food resources, is occurring by both air
and sea before we have had the chance to collect adequate
data on natural environments and their biodiversity. Add
to this the rapid political devolution accompanying the
partition of the Northwest Territories, coupled with the
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ever-growing international interest in Arctic Canada, and
it is painfully ironic that Canada is in the process of
dismantling its capacity to conduct Arctic research.
The question remains: has this been the deliberate
choice of the political leadership, or merely a side effect of
the economics of deficit reduction? We argue that it has
been a negative side effect. But whatever the answer to that
question, the serious setbacks to Arctic science and tech-
nology over the last decade have left us on the verge of
elimination from the international arena. We do not know
to what extent these actions have resulted from the lack of
a Canadian Arctic Science and Technology Policy. How-
ever, in its absence, we do know that Canadians are increas-
ingly incapable of being players on their own scientific stage.
And now oversight and indecision have caught up to us!
THE FEDERAL ROLE
The most telling sign of diminishing commitment to
northern research in Canada has been the progressive
withdrawal, during the past decade, of all major research
agencies within the Federal Government. Traditionally,
these agencies have constituted the core of northern re-
search, housed mainly in the departments of Environment,
Fisheries and Oceans, and Natural Resources, with the
latter playing a key role through the Polar Continental
Shelf Project (PCSP). Our primary research agencies have
included the Atmospheric Environment Service, the Geo-
logical Survey of Canada, the Canadian Hydrographic
Service, the Canadian Wildlife Service, Health Canada,
the Canadian Museum of Nature, and the Canadian Mu-
seum of Civilization. These, along with university re-
searchers from all disciplines, have been served logistically
by the PCSP. Concurrently, the government agencies have
routinely spun off substantial support for university col-
laborators, particularly for graduate students, in informal
but effective synergies that enhanced university research
capacity in the Arctic greatly beyond what would other-
wise have been possible. This support also served to build
numerous bridges between federal scientists and academia
that facilitated cooperative programs and diminished un-
productive rivalries.
In its laudable pursuit of deficit elimination, the Cana-
dian government chose—unfortunately, from our perspec-
tive—to target its research departments for downsizing.
Although it would be hard to make the case that spending
on research produced our deficit, science programs, hence
scientists personally, have paid a large part of the cost of
reducing it. There is little point in challenging the specific
decisions taken in the Federal Program Review, but we
might benefit from recognizing how ineffectively the sci-
entific community defended itself. What, for example, did
Canadian university presidents, individually or collec-
tively, contribute to the discussion about the downsizing
of federal science? Did anyone point out to the decision
makers that their apparent assumption about the net cost of
research is incorrect? Indeed, it is increasingly recognized
that research drives modern economies, and that the real
cost of research left undone will be mistakes due to igno-
rance. Despite the long-term importance of this perspec-
tive to the nation, it has received little public discussion.
In the process of downsizing federal science, Canada
has dismantled much of the infrastructure necessary to
pursue and promote our national and international respon-
sibilities in our own backyard. By eliminating hundreds of
scientists from federal laboratories, we have created a
science-employment environment that has diverted, and
continues to divert, students away from science. No one
appears to be measuring these effects, but the reality is
evident. Increasingly, so many young Canadian PhDs are
moving to the United States or Europe that many profes-
sors ask why they still bother training scientists at the
taxpayers’ expense. Someone should answer—carefully.
Arctic research was especially hard hit because it was,
and is, seen to be more expensive. Many managers seem to
have surrendered to this charge. Yet, we are unaware of
any comparative cost-benefit studies of Arctic versus
southern research. What are the long-term costs to Canada
of eliminating the Arctic scientific capacity it paid to
create over the last 50 years? When the inevitable next
“national imperative” (an energy crisis, for example) pushes
us back into the Arctic on short notice, what price will we
pay for the lost corporate and scientific memories? In the
natural sciences, it commonly takes an individual half a
career to develop his or her best set of research questions.
Persistence and continuity are indispensable.
And expense has not been the only objection. “Why
work in the Arctic? No one lives there,” said a former head
of the Geological Survey of Canada, who—apparently on
no stronger argument that this—rendered all Arctic re-
search in that agency basically irrelevant. It is seemingly
impossible to defend a program against such a stance, or at
least, in this case, defence was unsuccessful. Unfortu-
nately, our impression is that the success of Arctic re-
search in Canada has relied all too often on the good graces
of a handful of individuals who were favourably disposed
towards the importance of the Arctic. Such reliance left it
vulnerable to those who were not.
There is also a fundamental ethical issue here regarding
Canada’s relationship to its Arctic territories: is it appro-
priate for Canada to take an interest in Arctic science and
in the environment only when opportunities for exploita-
tion of natural resources by southern or foreign interests
loom large, or only when such exploitation seems neces-
sary for the good of the nation? This is a rather colonial
attitude. Yet the current spurning by federal agencies of
long-term Arctic science, not so much by choice as by
economic necessity, sends exactly this message. Most
appreciate that basic scientific problems, including those
like global change with particularly strong and recognized
Arctic relevance, can only be addressed in the long term.
Still, acceptance of this fact does not secure support for the
research.
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It is incumbent upon Canadians to address basic ques-
tions about the Arctic, as we remain the only nation other
than Greenland with extensive High Arctic terrain within
its borders. Why, for example, is it economically justifi-
able for other first world nations to conduct Arctic re-
search, including a great deal in Canada, when apparently
it is not so for us? To what degree can Canada afford or
expect to rely on its neighbours for scientific knowledge in
policy areas such as climate change and transpolar pollu-
tion? To the extent that southern Canadians are aware at all
of the Arctic half of our nation, and of its environmental
and cultural uniqueness, how much of this awareness is
owed to decades of recruitment of young Canadians by
Arctic scientists, and to their teachings, lectures, and
publications? To what extent has the legitimization of
Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago arisen
from the field activities of Canadian government and
university scientists?
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH
In comparison to our neighbour to the south, a greater
proportion of Canadian science has been done in federal
laboratories. Assuming this is undesirable, a new balance
might have been struck by shifting resources to the univer-
sities, using a carefully planned strategy designed not to
diminish our overall capacity. Unfortunately, however,
Canadian universities and federal science departments
experienced downsizing simultaneously. The combined
result has been a massive retirement and deportation of
Canada’s scientific human resource base. One can only be
confused, therefore, by statements in the last federal budget
that announce an impending shortfall of scientific talent a
decade down the road, while deliberate steps continue to
be taken to reduce Canada’s science capacity.
  Canadian university research in the Arctic is funded
mainly by the major federal granting agencies (the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council, NSERC, and
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council,
SSHRC) through their Operating Grants and equivalents.
The PCSP provides logistical support, which is typically
of greater dollar value than granting agency support. In-
deed, the granting agencies evaluate Arctic science appli-
cations on the assumption that established PCSP support
will continue, and the awarding of a grant by these agen-
cies, after rigorous review in a very competitive system, is
an indication, to PCSP among others, that the science is
worthy of support. The ongoing removal or serious reduc-
tion of PCSP support (including closure of Tuktoyaktuk
base) will render some programs financially unfeasible,
jeopardizing their NSERC/SSHRC support. Meanwhile,
NSERC and SHHRC have had their budgets seriously
diminished, their helpful “northern supplements” long
since ended, and many grants have been terminated. Al-
though this year’s federal budget made a commitment to
begin restoration of funding levels to these agencies, the
typical operating grant (commonly below $30 000 and
rarely above $50 000 for scientists with Arctic field pro-
grams) cannot absorb the logistical costs traditionally
born by PCSP. And so it spirals. Canadian university
research in the Arctic, already at a low level, will essen-
tially disappear unless funding and support are increased.
It is that simple.
The funding crunch for university research has resulted
in a steep decline in applications for logistical support to
PCSP during the 1990s, from a high of 70 projects down to
c. 40 this year. Government projects have declined even
more severely, by close to 50%. In 1980, PCSP actually
supported 166 field parties and this number grew to a high
of 250 parties during that decade (George Hobson, pers.
comm. 1998).
In the meantime, our established community of north-
ern scientists is aging and retired, or retiring younger.
Upcoming researchers face fewer opportunities. As confi-
dence in Canadian prospects of funding and logistical
support for northern research continues to erode, it comes
as no surprise that few will risk their futures by investing
in northern careers. Hence, academic recruitment in Canada
for northern research has reached alarmingly low levels
and a compelling option, if not a necessity, for anyone with
northern interests is to head to the United States or Europe.
Indeed, few Canadian universities are recruiting Arctic
specialists today, possibly because the chances of building
a program attractive to the university are so daunting. Or
our southern universities themselves may simply have lost
interest.
Canada now faces a crisis in northern research (and
perhaps research in general) that, if left unchecked, will
ensure our failure to train and support the next generation
of scientists and lead to a collapse of Canadian scientific
sovereignty. We will then be unable to meet basic national
obligations to adequately monitor, manage, and safeguard
our environment, let alone to take a leadership role or to
strongly contribute to issues of international importance.
It is already much more common to hear science about
Canada from others at international meetings than it is to
hear Canadian science. But, to be perfectly clear about
what we think is wrong here, it is not the attention of our
neighbours and friends. Indeed, we suspect that Ameri-
cans who are sensitive to this issue go out of their way to
include Canadians in their programs, allowing the prob-
lem to seem less severe than it is.
LEARNING FROM THE FRIENDLY GIANT
It is a sad but recurrent reality that to get the attention of
Canadian policy makers one must often resort to embar-
rassing comparisons with our American neighbours. The
need to do so is especially aggravating when it deals with
such a fundamental issue of our Canadian identity. Granted,
we occasionally forget the words to our own national
anthem, but have we also forgotten where we live? Why
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must Canadians continually hound their government to
provide the support necessary to pursue what should be an
inherent and irresistible interest in our own country? In a
letter to the Globe and Mail, in response to the country’s
predisposition to ignore its Arctic, England wrote that, like
Dracula, Canada runs the risk of standing in front of its
own mirror and failing to appear.
While Canada has been dismantling Arctic research, the
United States has demonstrated a renewed commitment
through rigorous legislation, strong funding, and required
interagency cooperation. A comparison of the two coun-
tries in Arctic matters reveals American vision towering
over Canadian indecision and parsimony, and the conse-
quence is opportunity and leadership vs. unemployment
and ever-dwindling significance. Surely this cannot be
because Arctic research is less relevant to Canada! It is the
saddest form of flattery when we are informed that the
recent American initiative arose from the pleas of Ameri-
can scientists, familiar with PCSP, who sought, in part, to
emulate our success in Arctic research.
In northern matters, Canada suffers even more from a
lack of leadership than from a lack of resources. Therefore,
given Canada’s reluctance to take a fully integrated, lead-
ership role in the Arctic, it is instructive to look closely at
what is clearly an extremely progressive American lead.
Afterwards, we will discuss some recent developments
that show promising signs of Canada’s renewed commit-
ment to the North, at least at the political level, and how we
propose that this should be brought to further fruition.
The United States took an immense step forward when
it passed the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984
(amended 1990) (See IARPC, 1997: Appendix E). In so
doing, the United States recognized itself as an Arctic
nation with strong strategic, economic, social, scientific,
and international interests pertaining to “all United States
and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle” (SEC.
112). Passed before the end of the Cold War, this Act
addresses a wide array of issues and includes an assigned
and dedicated budget. It speaks about the fact that “Federal
Arctic Research is fragmented and uncoordinated” (SEC.
102.(a)11) and that “improved logistical coordination and
support for Arctic research...is necessary” (SEC. 102.(a)
12). The Act set in motion a progressive infrastructure,
establishing an Arctic Research Commission to promote
research and recommend policy. The Commission was
complemented by the Interagency Arctic Research Policy
Committee which, in consultation with the Government of
Alaska, its public interests groups, and the private sector,
established a five-year plan to implement policy within
one year after enactment (sent to Congress, July 1987).
Since then, the plan has been revised every two years.
Biennial statements seek to ensure the pursuit of basic
principles of the U.S. Arctic Research and Policy Act. For
example, the January 1993 biennial statement identified
the need to improve the nation’s Arctic engineering capa-
bilities through coordinated and continuing programs at
universities and national laboratories. Finally, the Act
established the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF)
as the “lead agency for implementing Arctic research
policy” (SEC. 102.(b)3). The NSF subsequently created
the Arctic System Science (ARCSS) program.
Anyone concerned with the plight or future direction of
northern research in Canada should read the Fifth Biennial
Revision (1998 – 2002) of the U.S. Arctic Research Plan
(IARPC, 1997). It is evident that it is “the result of an
extensive process of planning, consultation and revision”
(p. 4). The Plan outlines national needs (nonrenewable and
renewable resources, global change, social and environ-
mental issues), a broad range of special focus multiagency
research programs, and a host of agency programs. The
total interagency funding for fiscal year 1997 was US$172
million, and for 1998 it is US$156 million. A selection of
agencies includes the Department of Defence, the Depart-
ment of the Interior, Department of Energy, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National
Science Foundation, which includes the Office of Polar
Programs. The multiagency programs stand out for their
breadth and depth, and include issues such as risks to the
environment and people in the Arctic, surface heat budget
of the Arctic Ocean, Beringian systems studies, and Arctic
data and information. The multiagency Beringian study
could just as easily describe the Canadian Arctic Archi-
pelago, emphasizing that this region is “emerging as a
major international arena for interdisciplinary study of
scientific issues and global change with historical and
modern perspectives” (p. 23). It emphasizes the funda-
mental importance of “baseline data and monitoring”
(p. 24).
The multiagency collaboration also identifies the im-
portance of Arctic data and information, participating in
the Arctic Environmental Data Directory (AEDD), an
IASC initiative which resides on the World Wide Web,
linking more than 50 other Arctic data and information
sources. The AEDD Working Group is further connected
with the United Nations Environment Program Global
Resources Information Database in Arendal, Norway.
Together they have established compatible directories for
an international Arctic Data Directory. Efforts are being
made to establish a third node in Moscow. These are
important initiatives, as Arctic information databases and
CD-ROMs rapidly proliferate and require collation and
simplified access. The U.S. Polar Information Working
Group is also attempting to provide a single, user-based
service for U.S. Arctic and Antarctic scientific communi-
ties that require the matching of information sources and
needs. This effort includes a wide range of U.S. universi-
ties (Alaska, Dartmouth, Colorado, Ohio State, all notable
Arctic science schools) together with other organizations
like the Arctic Research Consortium of the United States.
A veritable plethora of acronyms (Appendix A of the Fifth
Biennial Revision) attests to the profusion of arctic agen-
cies and information in the United States.
Agency programs within the Fifth Biennial Revision of
the Plan outline new opportunities for Arctic research
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efficiency are a monument to the dedicated efforts of its
directors on behalf of Canadian polar science. It is now
entirely a logistical operation, but a seasoned one, based in
Ottawa with facilities in Resolute Bay (High Arctic) and
Tuktoyaktuk (western Arctic; now dormant). Each spring
and summer it has operated chartered aircraft (Twin Ot-
ters, helicopters) that provide the coordinated logistical
support for staging and evacuating fly (tent) camps widely
dispersed throughout the northern mainland and islands.
Principally, it has operated north of the Arctic Circle.
PCSP supports scientists from both universities and gov-
ernment research agencies who, for the most part, live
frugally while investigating everything from archaeology
to zoology, to borrow George Hobson’s expression. At its
peak during the 1970s and 1980s, PCSP had a budget of
around Cdn$6 million, largely dedicated to logistics. It
was administratively light, with a Director and couple of
base managers who quickly established an international
reputation for remarkable efficiency. For virtually every
client, it epitomized what a well-run government agency
could be. It has been audited several times by the Treasury
Board and received exemplary reviews. Only three years
ago, it was further evaluated for its perceived usefulness to
its clients: the government evaluators reported that they
had never seen such high praise in 30 years of assessment!
Despite such glowing recommendation, despite its ex-
tremely modest budget (20 cents per Canadian per year at
its peak), despite being indispensable to its clients, despite
the fact that it makes a Canadian presence in Arctic
research possible, and despite its astonishing success in
safety and efficiency, its budget has been cut progressively
and it now struggles to survive.
The tenuous support and persistent uncertainty that has
plagued most Arctic scientific careers in Canada makes a
fascinating story in itself. Hence, battling for the protec-
tion of PCSP has become a distraction and a necessary
obligation. On two separate occasions, lobbying by Eng-
land (and others) of two Cabinet Ministers (Deputy Prime
Minister Don Mazenkowski on PCSP’s 30th anniversary,
1988; and Minister Anne McLellan of Natural Resources
Canada, during Program Review, 1996) facilitated tempo-
rary increases or reprieves for its budget. These interven-
tions by Ministers attest to their perceptiveness and
willingness to acknowledge and validate Canada’s Arctic
mandate. They readily acknowledged the necessity of a
supporting agency like PCSP for fulfilling our national
responsibilities toward the Arctic. Furthermore, parlia-
mentary documents are filled with wonderfully supportive
statements about the intrinsic value and necessity of Arctic
research to Canada (see, e.g., Canada and the Circumpolar
World, Report of the House of Commons Standing Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, April
1997; and the Third Conference of Parliamentarians of the
Arctic Region Conference Statement, April 1998). It ap-
pears to us, therefore, that the political leadership is will-
ing to support Arctic research, but that there has not been
similar consistency within the civil service.
(remote sensing, U.S.-Russian collaboration, etc.) and
scientific programs dealing with the Arctic Ocean and
marginal seas, atmosphere and climate, land and offshore
resources, land-atmosphere-water interactions (glaciology,
hydrology, and permafrost), engineering and technology,
social sciences (U.S. Man and the Biosphere Program,
Human Dimensions of Global Change Program, cultural
resources, etc.), and health.
The main text of the Fifth Biennial Revision ends with
a section on logistics that reduces Canadian worries about
PCSP to black comedy. The Plan starts off unabashedly
stating that “it reaffirms that an ice-capable research ship
should be operated as a national facility for both the
Federal and academic communities,” adding that “a re-
search vessel providing all-season access to the Arctic
region is essential for many research requirements”
(p. 47). It also notes that in 1994 the U.S. Arctic Research
Commission implemented a Memorandum of Agreement
to lay the foundations for “annual nuclear submarine
cruises dedicated to science in the Arctic Ocean....to con-
duct unclassified experiments selected from competitive
proposals....with the costs being shared by the U.S. Navy
(which will provide the Arctic-capable submarine at no
cost to the science community)” (p. 47). Satellite surveil-
lance using a wide range of technologies is available for
such interests as worldwide sea ice extent (on a weekly
basis), and land-based facilities are available from local
agencies in Greenland, the Canadian High Arctic (PCSP
receives mention), and the Norwegian Polar Institute in
Svalbard.
Simply put, the scope, integration, and support for
Arctic research in the United States is enormous. And
make no mistake, it is based rigorously and thoughtfully
upon established principles and objectives. There is no
indecision here! No suffocating parsimony. It seems to us
that Canada at this point has two choices: rely entirely on
the United States for all Arctic science (contracts would
probably be welcomed) or seriously acknowledge its own
geographic identity and behave accordingly.
WHITHER PCSP: NOT AFFORDABLE AT
20 CENTS PER CAPITA PER YEAR!
It is important here to return to and to make clear the plight
of the Polar Continental Shelf Project. It highlights the
contrast between U.S. and Canadian Arctic strategies, and it
effectively shows the urgency and the extent of our crisis.
PCSP, currently celebrating its 40th anniversary, was
established by Act of Parliament in 1958, as part of Prime
Minister Diefenbaker’s “northern vision.” It was vision-
ary, it has been gloriously successful, it has fostered most
of Canadian Arctic research and assisted non-Canadian
research. PCSP started out as a bold and innovative solu-
tion to the scientific field requirements for exploring the
vast and diverse Canadian Arctic Archipelago and adja-
cent continental shelf. Its successes, ingenuity, and
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Despite the political interest, by 1999 PCSP’s budget
for its entire Arctic field operation will drop to about
Cdn$1 million (US$710 000; approaching one-sixth of
peak funding, without correction for inflation). The NSF-
funded PALE Project (Paleoecology of Arctic Lakes and
Estuaries) has a Steering Committee budget of US$600 000.
Soon PCSP will be able to offer only a meagre Cdn$250 000
(US$178 000) for the entire Canadian university commu-
nity. About one-third its level of only three years ago, this
amount would fall within the range of a single modest NSF
project. A recent report from an Arctic institute at an
American university lists nearly US$20 million in current
research grant holdings for that institution. At Cdn$1
million per year, PCSP’s logistical operation costs Cana-
dians about 3 cents per citizen per year, less than the GST
on a 50-cent chocolate bar! Compared to the present U.S.
Arctic research commitment, PCSP, which started out so
bold and gave us such pride, now looks like a rusted-out
VW Beetle with four flat tires eclipsed by the gleaming
technology of the space shuttle. This contrast cannot be
dismissed as due solely to economies of scale; to a large
degree, it is due to Canada’s economy of self-betrayal.
The plight for government research agencies, which
previously received full logistical support for much or all
of their Arctic programs from PCSP, is equally severe.
Traditionally, awards to these agencies did not include
funds to cover logistical costs because such costs would be
covered by PCSP. Now these agencies find their own
budgets severely reduced and PCSP with minimal re-
sources. These agencies are now required to provide 50–
100% cost recovery, varying from project to project, and
there is no relief in sight. The effect is the same as for the
universities. Effectively, PCSP is being forced to move
from the role of research facilitator to that of travel agent.
It is also moving toward an unattractive ratio of budget
allocated for logistical support to budget allocated for
overhead cost, despite cutting the latter to the bone. This
is not a justifiable position for an agency whose sole raison
d’être is logistical support and which plays neither a
research nor a policy role.
The crisis for Arctic research in Canada is thus obvious.
The overall effect of our collective failure, however, will
also be much greater than the straight percentage reduction
in support because the overall reduction in the synergy and
calibre of Arctic research will be much greater as critical
mass is lost. The political danger here is that it becomes easy
to misconstrue the diminished ranks of university applicants
and number of government projects as expressions of dimin-
ished scientific interest and low relative importance of Arctic
science to the nation. Nothing could be further from the truth,
but saying this will not solve the problem.
LOOKING AHEAD
What we present here echoes the thoughts of many
Arctic researchers who are struggling to find signs of hope
on Canada’s horizon. The Government of Canada strongly
supported the establishment of the Arctic Council, and the
government’s commitment to conservation under the Arc-
tic Environmental Protection Strategy clearly requires an
ongoing contribution from Canadian scientists. The Stand-
ing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(SCFA) recommended that “the Government commit to
maintain, and seek to increase, support for basic Arctic
science and research as an important element of circumpolar
cooperation.” It effectively sets aside the “expense” argu-
ment in stating that “the cost of Canada’s [Arctic] research
was never high in comparison to the amounts spent by
other Arctic states” (SCFA, 1997:180). It validated the
argument advanced to it by Michel Allard (SCFA,
1997:180) that “Canadian scientific research in the North
produced, especially from 1950 to 1989, … spectacular
results with investments that were in fact far inferior to
those made by the major powers.”
Canada also took the initiative of establishing a Polar
Commission in 1991 and appointing an Arctic Ambassa-
dor in 1993. The Polar Commission reports to the Minister
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and is re-
sponsible for fostering the development of knowledge
about the polar regions in Canada, much like the U.S.
Arctic Research Commission. Although it has a budget of
about $1 million per year for this purpose, it appears to
lack the scientific depth of the U.S. Interagency Arctic
Research Policy Committee. The Arctic Ambassador re-
sides in Foreign Affairs and reports to both the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Minister
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The post is
connected to the international political forum and it is the
first chair of the Arctic Council.
There are many other players in the Canadian Arctic
research community. The Association of Canadian Uni-
versities for Northern Studies (ACUNS) promotes north-
ern education, organizes a biennial student workshop (last
December, brimming with capable enthusiasm), has a
small fund for scholarships, and—increasingly—lobbies
all levels of government to reinvigorate Arctic research.
The Northern Science Training Program of the Depart-
ment of Indian Affairs and Northern Development has
opened the door to the Arctic for numerous students by
awarding small grants. The Royal Canadian Geographical
Society also provides northern student scholarships, and
alerts the country about northern issues through its widely
subscribed magazine, Canadian Geographic, and through
the sponsorship of cross-country lectures. Research and
scholarly institutes at Canadian universities (Canadian
Circumpolar Institute, University of Alberta; Centre
d’études nordiques, Université Laval; The Arctic Institute
of North America, University of Calgary) play important
roles, foremost among which is the publication of this
journal, but they are smaller than most of their American
counterparts (e.g., Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research,
University of Colorado). Canada continues to maintain a
very active nongovernmental watchdog agency concerned
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the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the Geological
Survey of Canada (Natural Resources Canada) maintains
divisions at both institutes, apparently without loss of
institutional integrity. Like oceanographic research, polar
research is unified by its special logistical needs and by its
strongly interdisciplinary composition. A Canadian Polar
Institute could bring together many polar science and
policy groups, without any rigid requirement of being all-
inclusive at the expense of existing federal agencies. The
challenge would be to construct an institute with suffi-
ciently “porous walls” to optimize interaction between the
institute and universities. Ideally, it would be the venue of
choice for Canadian and international scholars on sabbati-
cal leave, for private sector scientists working on Arctic
problems, and for researchers from northern communities.
We emphasize the need to collect, coordinate, and
streamline existing Arctic interests in a new Polar Insti-
tute. Coordination of logistics must now be matched by
coordination of research to demonstrate optimum effi-
ciency. To facilitate the greatest efficiency and expertise
in Canadian Arctic interests, the Institute should house
both the PCSP and the Polar Commission. PCSP could
then be fundamentally rejuvenated and tethered to a strong,
mandated, research agenda. The Polar Commission would
continue to act as the nation’s premiere Arctic-Antarctic
policy adviser, and it would continue to promote public
awareness of the North. The Polar Commission would
have the added advantage of continuous and direct access
to an active scientific community. Similarly, the Arctic
scientific community would benefit from the broader per-
spectives of the Polar Commission, including its First
Nations members, who could strongly influence research
agendas. Finally, the Institute would promote appropriate
linkages with Canada’s three northern territories and with
First Nations organizations in the arctic regions of the
provinces, primarily Labrador and arctic Quebec.
Canada cannot afford to stand disorganized in the midst
of a more progressive international community while hold-
ing jurisdiction over such a large proportion of Arctic land
and sea. As a member of the Arctic Council and participant
in the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Canada
will increasingly be expected to contribute to the gathering
and dissemination of knowledge, to ensure stewardship of
its environment, and to provide the best service to its
Arctic citizens, who are now divided among seven territo-
rial and provincial jurisdictions. To accomplish this, we
must first set in place the funding and the infrastructure to
address challenging, long-term issues (e.g., global change,
polar pollution) and to train future Arctic scientists. There-
fore, Canada needs a thoughtful and progressive Arctic
Science and Technology Act. We strongly recommend
that such an Act embody within it a Canadian Polar
Institute and that interested Canadians be widely and
extensively consulted in drafting the Act. Unless we re-
structure our Arctic programs, we will continue the waste-
ful cycle of building, abandoning, forgetting, and
rebuilding. The risk of further delay is total collapse of our
with northern issues through the Canadian Arctic Re-
source Committee, which has been a vigilant and effective
lobbyist for several decades. Nonetheless, much of this
activity throughout Canada remains diffuse and poorly
coordinated. Furthermore, the leadership role of the Polar
Commission has not been “perceived as a legitimate voice
of those interested in northern research” (SCFA, 1997:187);
and its current ineffectiveness in promoting national Arc-
tic interests has brought widespread disappointment. How-
ever, its mandate has been extended in the latest federal
budget and its potential for leadership persists.
So where can we go from here? Clearly it is intolerable
to languish in our present state. Therefore, as an idea for
discussion by the Canadian Arctic science community, we
resurrect here the proposal that Canada establish a Cana-
dian Polar Institute. This institute would effectively house
and coordinate our national goals and expertise in Arctic
social and natural science, technology, logistics (PCSP),
and policy. It should be a real (as opposed to a virtual)
institute, where people can gather and interact. It should be
established by an Act of Parliament, and set firmly upon
principles and objectives included in an Arctic Science
and Technology Act. International cooperation with other
Arctic institutes and agencies would be an implicit objec-
tive. We can see no other way to safeguard Arctic research
and its essential infrastructures in times of intense funding
stress. A Canadian Polar Institute could also play an
indispensable role in planning and coordinating future
Arctic research.
In 1985, the Honourable David Crombie, then Minister
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, called for
consideration of a National Polar Institute. A working
group consisting of Dr. Fred Roots, Dr. Peter Adams, Mr.
Peter Burnet, and Mr. Mark Gordon carefully considered
the state of Canadian polar research at that time, as well as
the advantages and disadvantages of the Minister’s pro-
posal. In their report (Adams et al., 1987), they thoroughly
identified the problems and recommended, instead of a
scientific institute, a Canadian Polar Commission, which
was subsequently established. We do not suggest for a
moment that this was an error of judgement. However, the
fact that the problems that they and the research commu-
nity recognized a decade ago have so intensified since
illustrates that a sufficient solution remains to be found.
The situation today is different from that of 1985 primarily
in the reduced size of the research community and in the
perilous state of PCSP. An idea that came from Cabinet in
1985 surely is worth exploring again, now that the needs
are all the more evident.
We realize that a new institute would require new
funding and that the idea could most easily be killed by
bureaucratic turf wars. There are, however, ways to avoid
this. Although a range of models should be considered, an
attractive one is provided by Canada’s two oceanographic
institutes: the Bedford Institute of Oceanography
(Dartmouth, Nova Scotia), and the Institute of Ocean
Sciences (Sydney, British Columbia). Although housed in
already tenuous domestic capacity in Arctic research. But
nothing will happen unless those who comprise the Arctic
research community make their voices heard by present-
ing politically acceptable solutions.
Last December, Canada lost one of its most prominent
Arctic ecologists when Steve Zoltai passed away. All of us
knew Steve, and John England, together with colleague
Peter Kershaw, was honoured to sit with him only weeks
before, listening to him overcome his advanced illness to
speak passionately about these very issues. Steve made
one particularly moving point when he lamented that an
American would be responsible for producing the Cana-
dian component of the new Circumpolar Arctic Vegetation
Map. This is not to imply that the American does not have
the right and the knowledge to do this; rather, it highlights
our shortage of enlightened self-interest and our seem-
ingly perpetual inability to provide even basic responses to
international efforts—in this case, at a scale of 1:7 500 000!
We, and our colleagues, share Steve’s discouragement
about the persistent and lamentable indifference to the
North which, if left unattended, will go a long way toward
stifling our national identity. It is time for the Canadian
government to step to the plate and face north!
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